conducted, shallow water mines would had to have been identified and disabled by explosive ordnance disposal and Navy special forces. Such an undertaking would have been time - consuming and extremely risky to the individuals involved.

          Assessments of the capability and reliability of U.S. minesweeping / countermeasure equipment are mixed. The six MH - 53 helicopters were new when deployed and by all accounts were effective and reliable. Likewise, the reliability of the minesweeping and mine countermeasure ships was also satisfactory. Nonetheless, the Navy believes that the acoustic and magnetic signatures of the ocean minesweeping ships are inferior to those of our allies. Moreover, there were reliability problems with the ocean minesweeping ship's SQQ - 14A minehunting sonar and the remotely operated minehunting vehicle when deployed in strong currents. Finally, there was only one secure voice circuit available for numerous vessels, including the ocean minesweeping ships and the mine countermeasure ship, that too often resulted in messages being passed between ships on unsecured VHF radios.

          The significant Iraqi mine threat contributed to CENTCOM's decision not to conduct an amphibious landing on the beaches of Kuwait. CENTCOM planners estimated that it would take 10 - 14 days to clear the necessary Iraqi mines and to prepare the Kuwaiti beaches for such a landing, which decision makers judged to be too long. Of perhaps even greater concern was the potential for high casualties if such an amphibious landing were undertaken under the conditions existing at sea and on the beach at the time.

Counting the Iraqi Army

          After the war ended, a controversy erupted over the numbers of Iraqi military personnel in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations ( KTO ) and the numbers of Iraqis killed in the war. Dependable counts did not exist, which caused unease among the American public. How could we determine how many of our own troops to send without knowing how many Iraqi soldiers there were?

          There were two reasons people were not counted. First, CENTCOM did not believe soldiers were the most important measure of Iraqi military strength. The coalition command felt the numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery pieces provided the best measure of Iraqi power. A tank unit with no tanks ceased to pose a threat regardless of how many men were on the rolls. The command's goal was to destroy equipment, so it was equipment numbers the command sought.

          U.S. intelligence had the responsibility of determining the Iraqi military order of battle the numbers and types of units, their equipment and location. Substantial resources had been devoted to that effort all through the 1980 - 88 Iran - Iraq war. There was less focus on the order of battle after the 1988 ceasefire, but the assignment never lapsed.

          When the Iraqi Army began mobilizing against Kuwait in mid - July of 1990, interest in the Iraqi order of baffle soared. This produced an accurate day - to - day reading of the numbers of units in what was to become the KTO despite severe limitations on the conventional means of gathering data listening in on enemy communications and taking photos from reconnaissance planes overhead. It was difficult to listen in because the Iraqi Army was extremely disciplined about communications, punishing communicators

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