late for proper training. Some companies did not receive mineclearing equipment until the night of the attack ".

          Nonetheless, 1st and 2nd Marine Division breaching operations led the ground attack, blasting open holes in the Iraqi defensive barriers for coalition forces to pour into Kuwait. The success of these difficult operations can be attributed to the excellent training regimen developed in theater, the accelerated fielding of specialized equipment, the massive preparatory fire used to saturate the defensive barriers, the tepid resistance by Iraqi units manning defensive emplacements, and finally, by the use of intelligence to find and exploit gaps in and between Iraqi minefields.

          At sea, through the fall of 1990, the United States deployed six MH - 53 air mine countermeasures helicopters, three 1950's vintage ocean minesweeping ships ( MSO ), one modern mine countermeasure ship ( MCM ), and explosive ordnance detachments ( EOD ) to the region in anticipation of the need for minesweeping, particularly in the waters of the Persian Gulf itself. In mid - January 1991, before the commencement of hostilities, the USS Tripoli, a marine amphibious ship, was designated to support airborne mine countermeasure operations. Although ten allied countries ultimately provided 32 mine countermeasure vessels, except for the British units, these allied vessels did not arrive in theater or did not participate in mine clearance work until after the war had ended.

          The Navy and Marine minesweeping mine countermeasure efforts also ran into difficulties, largely attributable to inadequate training prior to the deployment. For instance, although doctrine calls for the coordinated operation of all mine sweeping / countermeasure forces ( i.e., ship and airborne minesweepers and explosive ordinance disposal ), pre - war training was generally conducted only by the individual forces. Fortunately, the three - month period between the time U.S. minesweeping forces arrived in the Gulf and the beginning of the war allowed for the conduct of critical training and repair work.

          The intelligence about the Iraqi mine threat was incorrect. Although there were indications of Iraqi minelaying activities as early as October 1990, CENTCOM decided to avoid any actions, including collecting intelligence, that could provoke hostilities before coalition forces were fully prepared. As a result, there was little hard intelligence on the details of the Iraqi mine threat by the time the war started.

          Nonetheless, estimates of Iraqi minelaying activities were made and often were wrong.

          Documents obtained after the war indicated that the Iraqis had laid 1,157 mines in a crescent across the northwest Gulf. However, U.S. intelligence estimates failed to indicate that the waters in the center of this crescent had been heavily mined. U.S. data predicted minefields only in the waters of Kuwait and in the deep water approaches to Iraq. The USS Princeton and the USS Tripoli were both damaged by Iraqi mines in February 1991 while operating in areas not estimated to be mined.

          Of great concern to those planning possible amphibious operations off the eastern coast of occupied Kuwait was the threat of heavily mined shallow waters - waters less than 30 feet deep that do not lend themselves to ship or airborne minesweeping / countermeasures. If an amphibious operation had ultimately been

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