the volume and compatibility limitations of the military communications system. Although the arrangement worked this time, it is risky to assume a strong commercial communications system will be available in every contingency. Moreover, relying on a commercial network made theater communications vulnerable to jamming, saturation and sabotage.

         Communications were worse in the field. For example, compatibility problems among the services were a constant headache in integrating the air campaign. Multiservice strike packages were difficult or impossible to assemble because various aircraft communicated in different ways over secure voice channels. Secure voice channels do not allow the enemy to listen.

         This caused not only planning problems, but also operational problems. For example, when the Iraqi Air Force was fleeing to Iran, an AWACS controller wanted to signal Navy F - 14s and Air Force F - l5s to turn off their radars to fool the Iraqis into taking off so they could be shot down. Because the AWACS is an Air Force aircraft, it was able to communicate this information to the Air Force F - 15s over secure voice but not to the Navy F - 14s. The F - 14s continued to operate their radars, which kept the Iraqis on the ground.

         The Air Tasking Order was hand delivered each day to Navy carriers because communications links between Riyadh and ships operating in the Gulf were too limited to handle the volume required. Initially, some Air Force units also received a hand - carried ATO, but this was a redundancy measure that eventually was discontinued.

         A Marine Corps General admitted that communications were a significant problem, especially in artillery fire support, because the equipment lacked sufficient range or frequencies. An Army battalion commander said it was extremely difficult to keep the 1972 vintage radios they had operating and within communications range. In some cases, platoon leaders were unable to talk on the radio to squad leaders who were a mere 75 feet away.

         However, many communications problems should be corrected when the newest tactical radio system, the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System ( SINCGARS ), is completely fielded. SINCGARS performed well in units fortunate enough to have received it before they deployed.

Tactical Missile Defense Succeed Politically, Raise Technical Questions

         Long before the air campaign began on January 17, the United States was concerned about the threat posed by Sadaam's Scuds. By the time the air campaign commenced, the United States already had deployed several Patriot batteries to Saudi Arabia to defend various high - value civilian and military targets.

         In an effort to draw Israel into the war and destroy the international coalition arrayed against him, Saddam launched nightly Scud attacks against undefended Israeli population centers beginning on January 18. While some Scuds missed their intended targets, others landed in Tel Aviv and Haifa, causing substantial damage. Iraq's

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