difference. Soldier for soldier, the U.S. military is now comprised of better educated, more motivated and more capable forces than at any other time in history. The outstanding performance of the American soldier, sailor, airman and marine during Operation Desert Storm proved the wisdom of recruiting a professional military and maintaining exacting and highly realistic peacetime training standards.

        This commitment to quality personnel yielded forces capable of adapting and succeeding in a harsh, demanding, unfamiliar environment. The ability to take forces " off - the - shelf " and ask them to perform in a variety of settings with minimal preparation in theater has important implications. The future military strategy may rely more heavily on rapidly deployable, U.S.-based units ready to fight on a " come - as - you - are " basis.

        Some initial assessments of the war have correctly pointed out the uniqueness of having a five - month troop buildup, which provided ample opportunity for U.S. forces to adapt to the Saudi desert's harsh environment and to train in theater. Thousands of hours of intensive training did take place during this period, both in the United States before deployment for some units and in theater for others. All this training undoubtedly saved lives as tactics were continually tested, analyzed and adjusted.

        However, most ground commanders credited realistic peacetime training and exercises for having established the proficiency that led to victory. Courses at specialized ranges, schools and training facilities such the Army's National Training Center, the Marine Corps.' Twenty - Nine Palms combined arms range, the Air Force's " Flag " exercises at Nellis AFB and the Navy's strike warfare university at NAS Fallon made the difference. A decade of investment, particularly. for Army and Marine ground units, yielded a force able to successfully execute complex, high - speed multi - corps operations with limited rehearsal.

        The fact that many major ground units arrived in the theater much later than units deployed from the United States but performed equally well in combat supports this view. For instance, the VII Army Corps, a Europe - based unit, launched the main coalition ground attack only two weeks after it completed deploying to the theater.

        One senior officer from the VII Corps commented:

        The corps was trained and ready [ when it arrived ]. The operation was a matter of adapting the corps and its people to conditions in Saudi Arabia. The corps had a large number of soldiers experienced in desert operations as a result of individual officers and soldiers who had gone through the National Training Center [ at Ft. Irwin, California ] and a division which had rotated its brigades through the Center.

        Another Army general said, "We had a good, solid training base when we began. The purpose of our training in Saudi Arabia was to get desert tough."

Communications Hampered by Old, Incompatible Equipment

        Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that tactical communications are still plagued by incompatibilities and technical limitations. At CENTCOM corps and wing levels, a significant portion of the war was conducted over commercial telephone lines because of

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