For example, the presence of a credible Marine Corps amphibious force off the coast of Kuwait tied down at least six Iraqi divisions. To reinforce the perception of an imminent amphibious assault, Navy SEAL teams conducted deception operations off the coast the day before the start of the ground war. Based on captured documents, prisoner interviews and the study of defensive emplacements along the coast, it is clear that the Iraqi Army believed the Marines intended to storm the beaches near Kuwait City.

         The use of the Army's VII Corps provides another example of the successful use of deception. The VII Corps initially was deployed to the center of the KTO in an area east of Wadi al-Batin to mislead the Iraqis into believing that the main attack would come from the south, not from the desert to the west. That impression was emphasized by the 1st Cavalry Division's maneuvers. First they conducted intensive cross - border operations as apparent preparations for war. Then they performed a limited holding attack east of the Wadi on the first day of the ground war, tying down four Iraqi forward divisions.

         Task Force Troy, a 460 - man Marine phantom division deployed south of Kuwait, used tank and artillery decoys and loudspeakers blaring tank noises across a 30 - kilometer front. The unit never had more than five tanks, but by constantly moving and firing from various decoy positions, it created the illusion of a much larger armored force.

Plans to Fight in Europe Created Problems in Southwest Asia

         Operation Desert Storm began shortly after the Warsaw Pact threat collapsed and highlighted certain challenges and problems the services must confront in the transition from the Cold War to the new world order. The Defense Department's focus on fighting a war in Europe created deployment, logistics and combat capability problems that could have hurt our effectiveness if the war had begun earlier or lasted longer than it did.

         On the day Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait City, the Army's "first to fight" units were either in Europe or in the United States earmarked for Europe. Consistent with a " Europe first " strategy, the Army's modernization program provided its force stationed in Europe with frontline equipment largely at the expense of the remaining Army units. Consequently, units charged with supporting Southwest Asia contingencies initially deployed with older, less capable equipment. This problem had to be corrected in theater by replacing early- version M1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles with newer models.

         Units earmarked for Europe had planned to fight in Europe using supplies ( Prepositioned Material Configured to Unit Sets or POMCUS ) already positioned in Europe. These units said their first significant challenge in Operation Desert Storm was coming to terms with deploying and possibly fighting with the equipment they had on hand. Unlike the Marines and the Air Force, the Army had very limited prepositioned equipment in Southwest Asia for arriving forces.

         The orientation toward fighting in Europe also caused problems in Operation Desert Storm in certain key support systems. Equipment has been procured for the last 20

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