bomb. Unable to destroy a well - protected bunker north of Baghdad after repeated direct hits, Air Force commanders sought new ideas. Within weeks the GBU - 28 was created from a surplus Army eight - inch gun tube filled with conventional explosive and a modified laser guidance kit from the GBU - 27 bomb. A few weeks later, the first two GBU - 28s were dropped on targets the same day the bombs arrived in Saudi Arabia. One destroyed the bunker, which was protected by more than 30 feet of earth, concrete and hardened steel.

Interservice Fights Avoided

        The sheer abundance of assets such as aircraft, airfields and tankers allowed the air campaign generally to accommodate all service points of view on the priorities of the air war. Since the three phases of the air plan strategic, interdiction and battlefield preparation -- were rolled into a single, massive campaign against all targets, differing service perspectives on the " proper " way to allocate and sequence air power to targets were more easily accommodated.

        The Air Force emphasized establishing early air superiority and pursuing strategic objectives within Iraq. The Navy emphasized neutralizing threats to the fleet, primarily Iraqi enemy aircraft and anti - ship capable systems. The Army placed priority on the interdiction of Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations ( KTO ). Even CENTCOM was able to impose its priority on the targeting of Republican Guard units from the outset.

        There were disputes among the Army, Marines and the Air Force over how best to prepare the battlefield. Ultimately, Deputy CINC General Calvin Waller had to step in and arbitrate these targeting disputes. And as the previous discussion on the ATO revealed, the Marines ended up pursuing their emphasis on preparing the battlefield outside the JFACC process, for the most part. Despite these disagreements, the battlefield was well-prepared for the ground campaign in the end.

GROUND CAMPAIGN ULTIMATELY FORCED IRAQI MILITARY OUT OF KUWAIT

        U.S. forces relied on superior training, equipment and mobility to overwhelm the enemy with maneuver and deception, achieving victory with minimal allied and civilian casualties. The swift and decisive victory of the ground campaign is a tribute to years of tough and demanding training by the Army and Marines for large - scale, complex, maneuver - oriented warfare.

Deception Works

        The astute use of deception kept Iraqi commanders constantly guessing the status and intention of coalition forces. Deception was ultimately a key factor in keeping a significant number of Iraqi forward units and tactical and operational reserves out of the ground war.

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