Some Marines echoed that complaint and also expressed serious concerns that the battlefield preparation was inadequate and inconsistent with the ground commanders' targeting priorities. At first, the Marines took matters into their own hands by routinely and systematically diverting sorties from their preplanned targets to " more urgent " targets or stuffed the ATO with " dummy " sorties to put extra aircraft in the air.

         As time went on, the Marines began removing their aircraft from the pool of assets available to the JFACC. They withdrew approximately half of their F / A - 18s so they could concentrate on preparing the battlefield in the KTO. By the time the ground campaign began, they had taken back almost all the rest.

         Despite the resistance of the Marine Corps and minor problems in the ATO execution, the central lesson of the air campaign should be clear: combining responsibility and unquestioned authority in the CINC -- in this case as delegated to his Joint Forces Air Component Commander -- for the planning and deployment of all theater aircraft optimizes the achievement of campaign objectives.

Tank Plinking and Other Operation Desert Storm Innovations

         In the heat of the conflict, necessity prompted innovation. Unlike the ponderous peacetime acquisition and doctrine development process, the press of baNe inevitably generated new tactics and unconventional uses of equipment.

         One example was the development of "tank plinking" to destroy Iraqi tanks buried in the sand or concealed in berms. U.S. forces discovered that the residual heat retained by the metal tanks showed up on F-111 infrared sensors at night. This enabled FI 1 IFs, F - l5 Es and, to a lesser degree, A - 6s to target and systematically destroy tanks that otherwise were difficult to detect. However, the final measure of success awaits further detailed analysis of post-war intelligence information.

         Many new uses were also found for the A - 10, long believed by many in the Air Force to be too slow and too old for the battlefield. A significant portion of the A - 10 fleet was slated for retirement before the war. But during Operation Desert Storm, the A - 10 proved effective far beyond its assigned close air support and battlefield interdiction missions.

         Although A - 10s have no inherent night fighting capability, crews found they could engage targets at night using the infrared seeker on the Maverick missiles they carried. Once they made this discovery, A - 10s flew against air defense sites, flew combat air patrols against Scud launchers and provided armed escort for search and rescue missions.

         A senior Air Force commander said, " In a low altitude environment, nothing can compare with the A - 10. It absolutely decimated first echelon forces. " An Army analyst added, " We found out that the A - 10 stood out as the aircraft which struck fear in the Iraqis, both psychologically and for its effectiveness ".

         A final example of innovation during the actual conduct of the war is the remarkable development of a new specialized munition, the GBU-28 5,000 lb. deep-penetrating

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