INTRODUCTION

         In exploring the lessons of the Persian Gulf war, it is essential first to establish the applicable caveats and limit the usefulness of lessons learned to future contingencies. As a senior U.S. commander, not without hyperbole, said:

         Desert Storm was the perfect war with the perfect enemy. The enemy leader was universally despised and his troops offered very little resistance. We had the perfect coalition, the perfect infrastructure and the perfect battlefield. We should be careful about the lessons we draw from the war.

         While this may overstate the point, it highlights the need for caution in drawing the right lands of conclusions about this war and then applying them universally to the conduct of future conflicts.

         On the other hand, it is equally important to acknowledge that certain aspects of this war are directly applicable to the type of conflicts U.S. forces might face in the future. For instance, the strategic air campaign against the Iraqi network of fixed, heavily defended targets provides a strategy that will likely apply to a variety of scenarios the U.S. military may face. Similarly, Iraq's centrally controlled military offers a potential model of the threat posed by previous Soviet clients.

         A final factor to consider is that others are analyzing the stunning U.S. military success as well. Many adjustments are likely to be made in the equipment and tactics of military forces around the world in the hope that they do not meet Iraq's fate.

         In sum, military operations in Operation Desert Storm provide an unprecedented and valuable opportunity to measure, challenge and adjust the policies and assumptions that will provide the framework for U.S. defense budgeting and strategy in the years ahead.

Historical Legacy

         The capabilities and philosophies central to the success of Operation Desert Storm were a result of the sometimes painful twenty - year post - Vietnam evolution of the way the U.S. military equipped, trained and organized itself for combat. The lingering lessons of previous conflicts and incidents were all found somewhere in the fabric of Operation Desert Storm.

         The defining experience for most of the senior civilians and officers who conceived and commanded Operation Desert Storm was the Vietnam War. Its lessons and failures all formed a powerful set of convictions about how to and how not to conduct a future war. One senior commander said:

         All of us who went through Vietnam were aghast at many of the things done in running that war. And, at the beginning of this one, one way or another we were all at that point in life where we could have easily retired. But we wanted to do the job right for the country. We

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